The Trial of Henry Kissinger
Forget Pinochet, Milosevic, Hussein, Kim Jong-il, or Gaddafi: America need look no further than its own lauded leaders for a war criminal whose offenses rival those of the most heinous dictators in recent history-Henry Kissinger.
Employing evidence based on firsthand testimony, unpublished documents, and new information uncovered by the Freedom of Information Act, and using only what would hold up in international courts of law, THE TRIAL OF HENRY KISSINGER outlines atrocities authorized by the former secretary of state in Indochina, Bangladesh, Chile, Cyprus, East Timor, and in the plight of the Iraqi Kurds, "including conspiracy to commit murder, kidnap, and torture."
With the precision and tenacity of a prosecutor, Hitchens offers an unrepentant portrait of a felonious diplomat who "maintained that laws were like cobwebs," and implores governments around the world, including our own, to bring him swiftly to justice.
deliberate understatement of what he was told by a United States official, who actually said that "at least 5,000" of the dead "were what we refer to as noncombatants": a not-too-exacting distinction, as we have already seen, and as was by then well understood (italics mine). Well understood, that is to say, not just by those who opposed the war but by those who were conducting it. As one United States official put it to Buckley: The actions of the Ninth Division in inflicting civilian
above cable directly refers and of which it is a more honest summary. Present for the "high USG level" meeting were, as noted in the heading: "Dr Kissinger, Mr. Karamessines, Gen. Haig." The first paragraph of their deliberations has been entirely blacked out, with not so much as a scribble in the margin from the redaction service. (Given what has since been admitted, this twenty-line deletion must be well worth reading.) Picking up at paragraph two, we find the following: 2. Then Mr.
would satisfy this bizarre criterion?) But then we learn, of the supposedly unruly gang that actually took its instructions seriously: In November 1970 a member of the Viaux group who avoided capture recontacted the Agency and requested financial assistance on behalf of the group. Although the Agency had no obligation to the group because it acted on its own, in an effort to keep the prior contact secret, maintain the good will of the group, and for humanitarian reasons, $35,000 was passed.
failure. But those who willed the means and wished the ends are not absolved from guilt by the refusal of reality to match their schemes. It is, from Kissinger's own record and recollection, as well as from the record of the subsequent official inquiry, quite easy to demonstrate that he did have advance knowledge of the plan to depose and kill Makarios. He admits as much himself, by noting that the Greek dictator Dimitrios Ioannides, head of the secret police, was determined to mount a coup in
clear-cut orders. Habib: We sent the cable because we thought it was needed and we thought it needed your attention. This was ten days ago. [Kissinger]: Nonsense. When did I get the cable, Jerry? Bremer: Not before the weekend. I think perhaps on Sunday. [Kissinger]: You had to know what my view on this was. No one who has worked with me in the last two years could not know what my view would be on Timor. [italics added] Habib: Well, let us look at it - talk to Leigh. There are still some legal