Honorable Treachery: A History of U. S. Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA
Foreign policy in peacetime and command decision in war have always been driven by intelligence, and yet this subject has often been overlooked in standard histories. Honorable Treachery fills in these details, dramatically recounting every important intelligence operation since our nation’s birth. These include how in 1795 President Washington mounted a covert operation to ransom American hostages in the Middle East; how in 1897, Kaiser Wilhelm II’s plans for an invasion of the United States were scuppered by the director of the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence; and how President Woodrow Wilson created a secret agency called the Inquiry to compile intelligence for the peace negotiations at the end of World War I. Honorable Treachery puts America’s use of covert intelligence into a broader historical context, and is sure to appeal to anyone interested in American history and the secret workings of our country.
Philadelphia merchant and congressman (who became known as the Financier of the Revolution), and asked for some “hard money to pay a certain set of people.”5 Morris quickly came through with a bag of silver coins, and Washington wasted no time in putting the money to work to hire the agents he needed. Washington’s accounts during the winter and spring of 1777 reflect his new emphasis on intelligence. Among the several large sums he paid out for intelligence collection during this period was the
then dealt with the legal relationships—contracts, leases, or other obligations—into which they entered. He dealt with similar security considerations in matters of claims for casualties, losses, and death benefits. The general counsel also compiled all information collected by the OSS on war crimes, and the War Crimes Branch of his office became part of the American prosecutor’s office during the postwar Nuremburg war-crimes trials. From 1943 to 1945, the OSS general counsel was James B. Donovan
counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. Although he submitted the paper in response to the request of the Foreign Affairs editor, he had originally written it while on the faculty of the National War College, at the instance of Secretary of Defense Forrestal. Forrestal had been so impressed by it that he had recommended it to the
Laotians, augmented by some seventeen thousand Thai mercenaries. Next door, in Vietnam, the agency and the Green Berets organized and trained the Civilian Irregular Defense Group, a counterinsurgency militia that grew to a force of seventy-five thousand by 1964. The sheer size of such operations precluded secrecy, and the CIA’s role was soon a matter of common knowledge. “In Saigon,” recalls one Clandestine Service officer, CIA was a large-scale enterprise, and CIA station chiefs became
for the same purpose.18 Fortunately, Arnold was refused the information in both instances. But if Tallmadge had begun to develop the instincts of a good case officer, he must have made a sharp mental note of Arnold’s inquiries. And Tallmadge must certainly have also wondered whether the John Anderson with the suspicious papers in his boot was the same man Arnold had named in his orders to Tallmadge of September 13: If Mr. James Anderson, a person I expect from New York should come to your