Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror (New Approaches to African History)
Foreign Intervention in Africa chronicles the foreign political and military interventions in Africa during the periods of decolonization (1956-1975) and the Cold War (1945-1991), as well as during the periods of state collapse (1991-2001) and the "global war on terror" (2001-2010). In the first two periods, the most significant intervention was extra-continental. The United States, the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and the former colonial powers entangled themselves in countless African conflicts. During the period of state collapse, the most consequential interventions were intra-continental. African governments, sometimes assisted by powers outside the continent, supported warlords, dictators, and dissident movements in neighboring countries and fought for control of their neighbors' resources. The global war on terror, like the Cold War, increased the foreign military presence on the African continent and generated external support for repressive governments. In each of these cases, external interests altered the dynamics of Africa's internal struggles, escalating local conflicts into larger conflagrations, with devastating effects on African peoples.
Service (SDECE) 175, 176, 179, 182, 183, 184, 185 see also France failed states see state collapse Faisal II, King 37–38 see also Iraq Fanon, Frantz 52 see also Algeria Farouk, King 37 see also Egypt Fashoda complex 181 see also France Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 216 Federal Republic of Germany see also Germany West Finland 82, 90 see also Nordic countries First Congo War (1996–1997) 209–211 see also Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
Minneapolis.) Map 0.2. Africa, 2011. (Map by Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis.) Introduction For many outsiders, the word Africa conjures up images of a continent in crisis, riddled with war and corruption, imploding from disease and starvation. Africans are regularly blamed for their plight. They are frequently viewed as being intolerant of ethnic and religious differences but accepting of corruption and dictatorship. They are often presumed to be unwilling or unable to
state collapse (1991–2001) and the “global war on terror” (2001–10), this book advances four central propositions.1 First, as colonial systems faltered, imperial and Cold War powers vied to control the decolonization process. While imperial powers hoped to transfer the reins of government to neocolonial regimes that would continue to serve their political and economic interests, Cold War powers strove to shape a new international order that instead catered to their interests. Although
dissension within and between branches of government. Policies are contested, and outcomes are the product of struggle. The good intentions of some quarters may be thwarted by the realpolitik of another. Humanitarian rationales may be genuine – or used to mask broader strategic and economic interests. Third, foreign intervention cannot occur without internal collaboration. To effect change in African countries, foreign governments must form alliances with indigenous actors who benefit from the
assistance to Ethiopia continued. After the Ogaden victory, Ethiopia harnessed Soviet aid in a futile attempt to crush the growing Eritrean liberation movement and the Tigrayan and Oromo insurgencies. By 1984, Moscow had provided Addis Ababa with more than $4 billion in military assistance, as well as some 2,600 Soviet and Eastern Bloc military advisors who trained and commanded the Ethiopian troops. The international spotlight again turned on Ethiopia in 1984–85, when another famine, caused by